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In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the 
readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself 
worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.1 
 
This line concludes The Proclamation of the Irish Republic, issued by the Easter 
Rising leaders on April 24th, 1916. It has proven to be a call to arms, not just for the 
men and women of 1916, but for each future generation of Irish republican 
paramilitaries. From the ashes of the Rising, came the Irish War of Independence 
(1919-1921), the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) and the Irish Civil War (1922-23). The 
Easter insurgency has also since provided the perceived historical mandate for the 
recurrent campaigns of the Border Campaign2 (1956-1962), the Troubles (1969-1998) 
and that of modern day violent dissident republicans (19943-present day). This history 
of insurgency and terrorism, which predates even the events of 1916, has shaped the 
political, social, economic and cultural identity of modern-day Ireland, both north and 
south of the border. The centenary of the Rising is being embraced, as a time of 
celebration and introspection. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the journey that 
Irish Republicanism embarked upon one hundred years ago. 
 
From the battles at the GPO, right through to the modern-day attacks on the streets of 
Belfast and Derry, paramilitary republicanism has taken many guises. This has 
provided researchers with a multitude of data and resources to analyse. Prior to 9/11, 
these opportunities were regularly embraced; with the Provisional IRA being the then 
most researched terrorist group.4 However, with the subsequent proliferation of 
terrorism research the focus for many has shifted elsewhere. The publication of this 
special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence reassesses the evolution of the Irish 
republican ‘struggle’ across one hundred years of sporadic violence. A diverse range 
of scholars has been brought together to share their invaluable research and insight. 
They represent both established and new voices in the analysis of Irish republicanism. 
The papers cover insights from political science, psychology, history, and crime 
science. While the authors predominantly come from within academia, this scholastic 
expertise is accentuated by the contribution of two authors, Rory Finegan and Sandra 
Peake, who utilise their experiences working for the Irish Defence Forces and victim 
support groups respectively to enhance our understanding. 
 
This volume should not be regarded as a complete anthology of one hundred years of 
Irish republicanism. Indeed, very few collections could claim to be. Instead, it 
represents a critical analysis of some of the key issues arising across each of the main 
paramilitary campaigns. Resultantly there are significant areas that are not, and cannot 
be, represented here; most notably non-violent political engagement and activism. 
Paramilitary activity represents the most sensational, but far from the only section of 
Irish republicanism history. Since 1916 some of the most significant gains have not 
come from the bomb or the bullet, but from peaceful protests, negotiations and day-
to-day electoral politics. The history of modern-day Northern Ireland may be marred 
by over 30 years of near persistent terrorism and violence. But in stark contrast to this, 
has been the ever-present peaceful activism of the civil rights movement, ‘Women for 
Peace,’ the SDLP and many others. In order to gain a holistic understanding of Irish 
republicanism, nationalism, the Troubles and the Peace Process it is imperative that 
the analysis of these, and other, non-violent actors is also included. However, this is 
outside of the remit of this special issue. 
 
It is our belief that the issues covered here are relevant not only to scholars of Irish 
republicanism, but also to anyone studying terrorism around the world. While there 
are distinct differences, there are also clear parallels to be drawn from the analyses 
presented here. The methodologies applied, and insight given, may assist in re-
assessing other global conflicts, across a range of different themes. We encourage 
scholars of other conflicts and terrorist groups to engage with the issues raised here. 
The long history of The Troubles gives an insight into all aspects of a terrorist 
conflict. It provides analysts with an opportunity to assess the evolution of a terrorist 
movement across the generations. The analysis shows how the movement can, and 
does, adapt to societal, political and security changes. It allows one to analyse what 
happens in the process of organisational fragmentation, strategic change and 
politicisation. The access researchers now have to primary sources from the Northern 
Ireland conflict, including interviewees and primary documents, is second to none. It 
is the engagement with these sources, as the authors throughout this special issue have 
done, which can bring us closer to a holistic understanding of a terrorist movement 
and insight into the inner workings of the organisations. Scholars of other movements 
and conflicts could use the understanding gained from this in-depth analysis as a 
means for shaping the construction of their research questions.  
 
The analysis of Irish republicanism, and the broader Irish Troubles, both in this issue 
and elsewhere has a significant part to play in developing our understanding of 
individual and organisational involvement in terrorism. It allows one to question 
whether ‘radicalisation’ is a necessary pre-requisite to terrorist involvement.5 It has 
addressed the potential politicising role of organisational splits, rather than merely 
looking at these organisational changes as the birthplace of further violence.6 The 
long-standing nature of the terrorist campaign has also provided researchers with the 
opportunity to develop, and analyse, vast datasets of paramilitary actors to examine 
the shifting and operational profile of the membership across the evolution of the 
paramilitary involvement.7 History has shown us that terrorist and guerrilla groups the 
world over have operationally, organisationally, technologically and strategically 
learned from the Irish republican terrorism. A clear example of this can be seen in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq with the utility of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
whose technology was reminiscent of the bombs used on the streets of Belfast, Derry 
and Armagh.8 Therefore if terrorist groups around the world believe that they have 
something to learn from Irish republican terrorism, it is incumbent on us as scholars 
of terrorism to continue in our endeavour to fully understand this case. It is both 
irresponsible and reckless to ignore the case of Northern Ireland just because the 
country is now ostensibly at peace. 
Articles 
Bringing together a special issue on one hundred years of Irish republicanism, can 
take a range of different routes. The focus could have purely been on the historical 
significance of the 1916 Rising. It could have provided an analysis of each of the 
different paramilitary campaigns. Or alternatively it might have focused on the 
parallel political and paramilitary struggles across the century. Each of these designs 
would have resulted in a worthwhile edition that supplemented our understanding of 
Irish republicanism. However, it was decided that an interdisciplinary focus would be 
applied in order to gain a greater understanding of some of the key issues, actions and 
actors, in the hundred years post-1916. They provide an insight, into republican self-
perception, but also how their loyalist adversaries view them.  
 
The successful politicisation of the Provisionals is seen in stark contrast with the 
many victims of their thirty years of violence. Peake and Lynch highlight the terror, 
which their victims and their families faced.9 In their article, they focus on one group 
of victims; ‘the disappeared.’ The case highlights the lengths of calculated cruelty that 
the Provisionals were willing to go to in order to gain power and control within 
nationalist and republican areas of Ireland. Although small, this group of victims 
highlights the complexities of the Troubles. In order to address this, the authors focus 
on the intergenerational experiences of the family of one of ‘the disappeared.’ The 
data generated through the semi-structured interviews with three separate generations 
of the family gives a vital insight into the experience of losing a loved one, in such 
devastating circumstances, an insight too often ignored in our academic research. 
 
The victims and targets of republican paramilitary violence, is a heterogeneous group. 
They range from civilians to security forces, businesses to criminals. This is 
highlighted across this edition, by authors analysing each phase of paramilitary 
republicanism. This is discussed from the very outset in Andrew Silke’s article, which 
opens the edition.10 In his analysis of the Irish War of Independence, he questions 
how the British military force failed to gain a victory over the IRA between 1919 and 
1921. He pays particular attention to the republican targeting of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC). Silke acknowledges that, while there are a variety of factors that 
aided the republican campaign, the targeting of the RIC was the cornerstone of their 
success.  
 
The strategic targeting of the state’s security forces has been employed by republican 
paramilitaries across their various guises. This is further emphasised by Morrison and 
Horgan’s article, which demonstrates the continuation of this strategy by the modern-
day violent dissident republicans (VDR).11 By analysing the data from their VDR 
events database, they demonstrate how different tactics are used to target distinctive 
groups of victims. Civilians are more readily targeted by shootings, and explosive 
devices more consistently target the security forces. They apply the criminological 
model of situational crime prevention, in order to understand this dichotomy of 
tactics. 
 
When analysing individual paramilitary movements and their campaigns, it can be 
easy to assess the relevance within a vacuum, not acknowledging its place in the 
wider international context. However, when we move away from this localised, at 
times blinkered, focus we can gain a greater understanding of the relevance of the 
campaign in the wider context. Kacper Rekawek endeavours to do just that.12 He 
revisits Operation Harvest of the 1950s and ‘60s, and places it within the wider 
international context. In this analysis he contrasts the efforts of the IRA with those of 
guerrillas fighting in Central and Eastern Europe. He questions if the Irish republicans 
had understood the failures of anti-communist campaigns (who mounted similar 
strategies), would they have approached their ultimately ill-fated campaign in a 
different manner?  
 
Rekawek argues that the IRA of the 1950s may have benefited from applying a more 
international focus. However, it is now more often the case that the Northern Irish 
example is the one being analysed internationally, by those wishing to garner 
knowledge. Many wish to unwrap, how a long-standing paramilitary force 
permanently moved away from violence. It is this maintained politicisation of the 
Provisional movement that is rightly seen as the cornerstone of the success of the 
peace process. In their separate pieces Rogelio Alonso and Sophie Whiting address 
this issue from differing perspectives. Whiting assesses, how this once violent force 
now maintains a consistent electoral appeal.13 She utilises opinion-polling data, 
coupled with internal party documents, to address how the organisation succeeded in 
this transition. Her analysis shows how the party divorced the military from the 
political, and maintained this through their centralisation of the party structure and the 
political professionalization. In the end she asks whether Sinn Féin is now entering 
into a form of ‘new’ politics. 
 
The transition from terrorism to politics was not achieved overnight. There was a 
drawn out period, where the Provisional movement were straddling their paramilitary 
past and their political future. During this transitional period, the leadership of the 
movement adopted a focused political communication strategy in order to 
simultaneously legitimise the violence of the PIRA and promote Sinn Féin as a viable 
political party. In his article Alonso addresses how the organisation went about 
achieving this.14 He argues that in order to succeed, the movement rewrote its past. 
This struggle for legitimacy is one that has seen a paramilitary movement responsible 
for death and destruction rebrand itself as the ‘peace party.’ 
 
This quest for legitimacy is the bedrock of any paramilitary, or political, movement, 
at each stage of their struggle. This is as true today for the VDR groups, as it was at 
any time for their PIRA predecessors. John Morrison analyses the statements of the 
‘IRA/New IRA,’ in order to understand how they attempt to legitimise their continued 
violence.15 Theirs is a violence that sits in contrast to the narrative of peace-process 
success. They claim that the justification for violence of the twentieth century is still 
present in the twenty-first. Through their public utterances, they attempt to legitimise 
their violence by promoting their own trustworthiness in parallel to the advancement 
of distrust in Sinn Féin’s ‘constitutional nationalism.’ Morrison argues that by taking 
note of the paramilitaries’ own narrative a viable counter-narrative may be developed. 
 
In their endeavour to understand one hundred years of Irish republicanism the 
contributors to this edition of Terrorism and Political Violence have analysed the 
republican movement, both political and paramilitary, but also those aiming to 
counter and fight against their armed activities. This has included an analysis of the 
state responses to the IRA, in its various incarnations, as well as the loyalist 
paramilitaries, from the other side of the sectarian divide. James McAuley and Neil 
Ferguson examine loyalist perspectives of the IRA and wider Irish republicanism via 
a series of one-to-one interviews.16 They trace the evolution of loyalist attitudes to 
republicanism. It was this evolution, which was vital to bring about the new reality of 
peace. The researchers display that loyalist attitudes are not purely antagonistic. 
Perhaps surprising to some readers, the perspectives observed are better described as 
pragmatic, influenced by societal and local events. These ‘enemies’ of Irish 
republicanism, now utilise the transformation of the Provisional Movement as a 
benchmark to assess their own progress in a post-peace process Northern Ireland. 
 
The loyalists promoted their paramilitary violence as a fight against the PIRA. 
Parallel to this were the various state-sponsored efforts aiming to bring an end to both 
loyalist and republican terrorism. Finegan assesses the role intelligence played in the 
British led counter-insurgency against the PIRA.17 His analysis demonstrates the 
evolution of intelligence, within both the military and law enforcement agencies. He 
surmises, that a patient strategy is more effective than more decisive actions, in the 
attempt to counter groups such as the PIRA. This patient strategy lies in stark contrast 
to the targeted assassinations analysed by Gill, Piazza and Horgan in their article.18 
Building on previous work,19 they consider the impact of assassinations of PIRA 
militants on subsequent PIRA IED attacks. Their findings indicate that discriminate 
and total assassination had little to no effect on subsequent PIRA IED attacks. 
However, the indiscriminate counterterrorism killings increased the likelihood of 
overall PIRA bombings, while also leading the PIRA to specifically target civilians in 
their IED attacks.  
Interviews 
One of the constant criticisms of terrorism research is the relative scarcity of field 
interviews. For some, this has contributed to a perceived stagnation in our 
understanding of terrorist motivations.20 It is clear that gaining interviews with 
relevant actors can be difficult in this line of research. However, it is not impossible. 
It should be pursued if safe, relevant, ethical and worthwhile, and most importantly if 
the researcher has the appropriate expertise and training. As some of the articles 
presented in this volume show, the access to interviews can significantly enlighten our 
understanding of the topics under review. As consumers of terrorism research we 
rarely gain access to the complete data analysed. We only see snippets of the 
interviews, the quotes deemed most relevant by the author to support their point. With 
this considered, we close the special issue by presenting long-form interviews with 
two key-actors from the heights of the Troubles. These interviews are unedited, and 
have not been analysed in any way. They are presented as such to provide readers 
with the opportunity to get as close an understanding to the interviewees own 
interpretation of the issues discussed. 
 The two men interviewed are Danny Morrison and Billy Hutchinson. Both played a 
significant role throughout the course of the Troubles, and within the subsequent 
peace process. Outside of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, Morrison, a former 
Provisional IRA prisoner himself, was one of the most visible members of the 
republican leadership throughout the height of the Troubles. He was Director of 
Publicity for Sinn Féin, as well as being editor for the newspaper Republican News 
from 1975, and subsequently became editor of the merged, all-Ireland, newspaper An 
Phoblacht/Republican News. During the 1981 hunger strikes of IRA prisoners, he 
became spokesperson for the leading striker, Bobby Sands. Morrison came to 
prominence outside of republicanism, when at the 1981 ard fheis21 he famously 
argued for a dual paramilitary and political strategy. 
 
“’Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will 
anyone here object, if with a ballot box in one hand and the armalite in the 
other, we take power in Ireland?’”22 
 
Within Morrison’s interview with John Morrison,23 he gives an insight on a range of 
issues, from the importance of the 2016 commemorations, to his reflections on his 
role during the 1981 hunger strikes and voices his robust critique of the modern-day 
violent dissident republicans.24 
 
Billy Hutchinson is one of the most prominent leaders of loyalism. While he is now 
the leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), for many he is better known as a 
former leading member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Hutchinson was sent to 
prison in 1975, for his role in the murders the year previously of Catholic workers 
Michael Loughran and Edward Morgan. This is a murder, which he claims was a 
necessity as he was fighting a war against republicanism and the possibility of a 
united Ireland.25 While in prison in Long Kesh, Hutchinson took over from Gusty 
Spence as the ‘officer commanding’ of the prisoner’s branch of the UVF. Upon his 
release from prison Hutchinson, alongside the late David Ervine, was an integral part 
in developing the PUP as a credible political voice in Northern Ireland. Within his 
interview with Neil Ferguson, Hutchinson analyses the centenary of the 1916 Rising, 
from a loyalist perspective. He argues that in spite of the various commemorations 
surrounding the Rising that in fact the Irish Civil War was of greater importance. 
Within his interview, he also reflects on other centenaries of greater relevance to the 
loyalist community; namely the Battle of the Somme and the formation of the UVF.26 
 
As with any interview, the words of Morrison and Hutchinson only represent their 
own views and experiences. These interviews represent their modern-day 
interpretation of the 2016 centenary, the Troubles and the subsequent peace process. 
In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the issues discussed, researchers 
need to engage with a variety of sources, both primary and secondary. Each interview 
is preceded by a brief paragraph, describing the context in which each interview took 
place. It is vital, that when anyone is interpreting any interview that a consideration 
for the context is at the forefront of their mind. The interview is only ever a snapshot 
in time. The context, whether it is local, national, international or personal, can have a 
significant effect on what the interviewee says. It may lead them to place greater 
emphasis on some issues than they usually would, and in contrast may also cause 
them to ignore other themes they would have otherwise discussed. 
Conclusion  
This collection of original articles and interviews provides a detailed analysis of some 
of the key aspects of the past one hundred years of Irish republicanism. By analysing 
the past, there are significant lessons to be learned for the future. It is clear that even 
though the peace process has been a success, the constant threat of Northern Ireland 
related terrorism remains. The advocates of violence see themselves as the heirs to 
Pearse, Connolly and Larkin. In their eyes they are Ireland’s children ready ‘to 
sacrifice themselves for the common good.’27 Their strategies and tactics reflect this. 
Their actions and statements are continuously borrowing from the past to justify the 
present. In order to counter this modern-day threat we must therefore endeavour to 
understand what has come before.  
 
The centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising has resulted in an island-wide introspection 
and reflection. Academics, politicians and citizens from all walks of life have 
considered the journey that Ireland has been on, from the battles of 1916 right through 
to the modern-day peace. It is important now that we are in the midst of the centenary 
that this historical analysis transforms into a discussion of Ireland’s future. In this 
discussion it must be appreciated that it is by acknowledging and understanding our 
past, that we can protect ourselves from the same mistakes again in the future. Our 
role as scholars of violence is to provide our insight, which can contribute to this 
debate. By compiling the research presented in this edition, we have aimed to make 
our contribution to this debate. However, this contribution does not begin and end 
with historical centenaries. The endeavour to gain an understanding of both violence 
and peace is one that continues long after the centenaries and commemorations are 
finished.  
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